Defining “Emancipation Events” in Divorce Agreements

Alan R. Feigenbaum ●

New York Law Journal, July 23, 2026 —

If you read the newspaper, listen to podcasts, or in some other way, shape, or form are attuned to the growing influence of artificial intelligence (“AI”) in our culture, you have likely heard about the possibility of material job displacement that could occur in various sectors of the workforce over the course of the next decade.

The news is also reporting how AI is impacting the college experience—specifically, with reference to instances of college students using AI to complete assignments, and professors spending their time using AI to try to detect cheating.

At the same time, anyone with college-aged children has in all likelihood wondered what the job landscape will look like on graduation day.

The question then becomes: will more young adults gravitate to some form of vocational school or program, perhaps, versus a traditional liberal arts education, to try to find some assurance that a profession awaits that is not going to get replaced or otherwise diminished by AI?

With all of this in mind, it may be time to re-examine how we, as divorce lawyers, define “emancipation events” in our settlement agreements. That brings us to the Honorable Jeffrey A. Goodstein’s recent decision in J.L. v. R.L., 2026 NY Slip Op 50813(U) (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.).

The parties in J.L. were married in 2002. T.L., the parties’ daughter, was born in July 2005. The ex-wife filed for divorce in 2021 and in 2023, the parties signed a Stipulation of Settlement and were divorced in that same year.

In J.L., the ex-husband filed a motion to direct the sale of the parties’ former marital residence, together with an order that his daughter, T.L. be deemed constructively emancipated thereby warranting the termination of his child support obligation. This article will focus solely on the issue of emancipation.

The ex-husband argued that his daughter finished school and was employed full-time. While the daughter did not go to college, the ex-husband claimed she completed an aesthetician (art and science of skin care) program and is employed at a salon. The ex-husband provided no proof of the name of an employer, or proof of income with respect to his daughter.

The ex-wife argued that under the stipulation of settlement, to become emancipated prior to age 21, the daughter had to be working full-time and be self-supporting. She claimed that her daughter did not work full-time and that she supported her daughter (paying for all of her housing expenses, and basic necessities such as food, toiletries, and her cell phone bill).

The stipulation of settlement was “silent” as to what happens if the daughter did not attend an undergraduate school. The Stipulation also did not define “undergraduate school.”

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Constructive Emancipation in Divorce: A Steep Evidentiary Burden

Alan R. Feigenbaum

New York Law Journal, August 21, 2025 —

One of the most glaring contradictions in the practice of matrimonial law is that divorce litigation proceeds all the way up through the start of a trial without being governed by the rules of evidence. But when a trial starts, perhaps years after the divorce action has been commenced, all of a sudden the rules of evidence are front and center.

The danger posed by this contradiction should be obvious: an attorney can prosecute an argument or arguments for the better part of 80 to 90 percent of the duration of a divorce litigation without concern for questions such as (1) is this hearsay, and if so, is there a hearsay exception that applies; (2) is this document authenticated; (3) can I get this document in evidence even though its author is no longer alive; (4) is this a business record, and many more.

But when trial starts, the unchained litigious arguments that an attorney can make in motion papers and at oral argument on motions without evidentiary restriction are met with a gigantic brick wall, and that attorney had better be ready with concrete evidence.

That brings us to the subject of constructive emancipation of children in divorce, which to my mind incorporates one of the most challenging and complex burdens of proof in the scheme of the many claims that can be made in the context of divorce litigation.

In the recent decision of L.E. v. Y.E., 2025 NY Slip Op 51038(U) (Family Court, Westchester County, May 2025), the petitioner-father sought to discontinue his child support obligations for his three children on the basis that they had been constructively emancipated. Prior to the father’s modification petition, the mother had been awarded sole legal and physical custody, with the father having “supervised and/or unsupervised access” with the children.

The father ceased paying all support in 2023, and alleged that “despite his efforts, the children have refused to see him for six years, and by their choice and not his actions, and as a result, are constructively emancipated.”

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